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Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform
Abstract
We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the
introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the
newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger
increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for
the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results,
incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse
selection.
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Approximately 49.9 million people in the 
United States lack health insurance (DeNavas-
Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2011). One potential 
driver of uninsurance is asymmetric informa-
tion on health risk between insurers and the 
insured. Asymmetric information can distort 
available insurance contracts, as in Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976), or it can raise premiums for 
the relatively healthy, as in Akerlof (1970). Both 
distortions result in inefficiently low levels of 
insurance coverage.
Predicated, at least in part, on concerns about 
adverse selection, the state of Massachusetts 
passed health reform in April 2006 aimed at 
achieving near-universal health insurance cover-
age. The Massachusetts approach is considered 
a model for national health reform, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 
signed in March 2010. A central feature of 
both reforms is a mandate that individuals 
obtain health insurance or pay a penalty. The 
Massachusetts mandate allows us to examine 
whether there was adverse selection into health 
insurance before the reform. In contrast, existing 
literature generally examines adverse selection 
among employer-sponsored plans (e.g., Cutler 
and Reber 1998; Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen 
2010), which is less relevant for policy.
Our simple empirical methodology is based 
on the observation that the direction of selection 
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depends on the difference between the cost of 
the marginal enrollee and the cost of those who 
already have insurance. If the cost of the mar-
ginal enrollee is below the average cost of those 
who are already insured, selection is adverse; 
if the cost of the marginal enrollee is above the 
average cost of those who are already insured, 
selection is advantageous. Therefore, as demon-
strated by Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010), 
the sign of the slope of the average cost curve 
captures selection.
We use the Massachusetts reform to provide 
an exogenous shift in coverage that identifies 
the slope of the average cost curve. We find that 
counties with larger increases in coverage over 
the reform period face the smallest increase in 
average hospital costs for the insured popu-
lation, consistent with adverse selection into 
insurance before reform. Additional results that 
incorporate cross-state variation and data on 
health measures provide further evidence for 
adverse selection.
I. Test for Selection
Our primary test for adverse selection relies 
on county-level variation in coverage. All 
Massachusetts counties reached near-universal 
insurance coverage through the reform, but 
some counties were more affected by the reform 
than others because of different initial levels of 
coverage. We estimate the following model:
(1)  Y ct = α ×  I ct +  δ t +  μ c +  ϵ ct ,
where  Y ct measures average hospital costs per 
insured inhabitant of county c in year t, and I 
captures insurance coverage;  δ t and  μ c control 
for fixed effects by year and county. We estimate 
equation (1) via instrumental variables where 
the set of instruments is given by the interac-
tion of a post-reform indicator and county fixed 
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effects, such that county-specific changes in 
coverage over the reform period are the only 
source of identifying variation.
Under adverse selection, we expect α < 0: 
an increase in insurance coverage improves the 
pool of the insured risks and decreases the aver-
age costs per insuree. Conversely, under advan-
tageous selection, the average cost of the insured 
grows as the pool expands: α > 0. Our primary 
specification focuses on hospital cost as the 
dependent variable because asymmetric infor-
mation is important for insurance insofar as it 
translates into cost. Furthermore, we can observe 
the universe of hospital costs in Massachusetts, 
and hospital costs account for the majority of 
medical spending.
To understand the mechanisms behind our 
cost results, we examine health measures and 
behaviors. We estimate variants of equation (1) where Y represents measures of the average 
health of the insured. Depending on the cor-
relation between the health measures and cost, 
the sign of α is a test for selection. If there is 
adverse selection, we expect the rate of diabe-
tes (a health measure that should be positively 
correlated with costs) to decline in the insured 
population. In contrast, we expect the rate of 
regular exercise (a measure that should be nega-
tively correlated with costs) to grow. If health 
insurance improves our measures of health, we 
will be biased against finding adverse selection.
We can also test for adverse selection by com-
paring Massachusetts to other states. We reesti-
mate equation (1) replacing counties by states. 
Our instrument for insurance coverage is then 
the interaction of a post-reform indicator and a 
Massachusetts indicator.
II. Data
A. Case Mix Data
We observe the universe of hospital discharges 
before and after the reform in the Massachusetts 
Case Mix Data from 2004 to 2009. The data 
provide information on insurance coverage for 
every hospital discharge.1 The data also pro-
vide information on the total charges for each 
1 We only consider variation in coverage between the 
insured and the uninsured, and not between different insur-
ance contracts. Thus, our underlying model of adverse selec-
tion is consistent with Akerlof (1970). 
discharge, which we convert to costs using the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project cost-to-
charge ratio. We prefer costs to charges because 
charges reflect prices, and hospitals might have 
changed their prices following reform. We 
deflate hospital costs into 2011 dollars using the 
medical care consumer price index provided by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
We focus on hospital costs for nonelderly 
insured patients aged 18–64. Using the patient zip 
code, we aggregate hospital costs to the county-
year level. To estimate the average hospital costs 
for all insured inhabitants, including those who 
do not visit the hospital, we incorporate addi-
tional data. For pre-reform coverage levels, we 
use the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) from 2005 by county. For post-reform 
coverage levels, we use the 2008 and 2009 esti-
mates from the American Community Survey (ACS), which is based on a much larger sample 
size than the SAHIE but is only available start-
ing in 2008. In all analyses, we drop the reform 
implementation years 2006 and 2007. We use the 
Census for county population estimates.
B. BRFSS Data
We complement the hospital cost data with 
health measures from the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS). We use average 
health measures for the insured population at 
the state-year level from 2004–2005 and 2008–
2010. We rely on random sample selection into 
the BRFSS, which allows us to compare health 
measures for the insured sample population 
directly, eliminating the need to merge cover-
age and population estimates from additional 
sources. We do not weight the average health 
measures or the average insurance coverage of 
the sampled population in our health regressions. 
We drop Dukes and Nantucket counties from all 
analyses because the BRFFS does not provide 
information on them in the pre-reform years.
III. Results
A. Hospital Costs
We compute the average hospital costs and 
the average insurance coverage by county for 
two periods: 2004–2005 and 2008–2009, and 
we plot the difference in each measure between 
the two periods in Figure 1.
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The linear fit weights counties by population 
size. We see a pronounced negative relationship, 
which suggests that counties that saw greater 
increases in coverage faced smaller increases 
in average costs per insured resident, consistent 
with adverse selection.
The first column of Table 1 shows the corre-
sponding IV estimate. The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. If we assume that 
equation (1) describes the average cost function, 
we can interpret the point estimate as the average 
hospital expenditure of the insured population 
as we move from no insurance to full insurance. 
Moving from the first (most expensive) enrollee 
to full insurance coverage reduces hospital costs 
by approximately $2,250 (about 50 percent of the 
2006 average premium for employer-sponsored 
health insurance, according to Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2006). To translate this coefficient 
into the observed change in average costs, we 
need an estimate of the coverage increase. First-
stage regression results at the state level from the 
BRFFS suggest that because of health reform, 
insurance coverage in Massachusetts increased by 
5.5 percentage points.2 Scaling the point estimate 
by the increase in coverage suggests that because 
of adverse selection, health reform reduced the 
annual average hospital costs for the insured 
Massachusetts population by about $124 (0.055 × $2,247) per person, approximately 3 percent 
of the 2006 average premium for employer-spon-
sored health insurance.
2 This weighted coverage increase is consistent with esti-
mates from other sources, reported in Kolstad and Kowalski 
(2010). 
The second column of Table 1 presents results 
from a county-year level OLS regression, which 
uses cross-sectional variation in the pre-reform 
period. The coefficient estimate is positive, sug-
gesting that without the reform-induced varia-
tion differences across counties provide spurious 
evidence for advantageous selection.
B. Health Measures and Behaviors
Table 2 displays the impact of reform on vari-
ous measures of health of the insured population 
aged 18–64, using variation by state. Signs of 
six of the seven health measures are consistent 
with adverse selection, and five of these are sta-
tistically significant. Results at the county level, 
not reported here, are broadly consistent: signs 
of six of the seven coefficients suggest adverse 
selection, but they are not statistically signifi-
cant, likely reflecting the small sample size at 
the county level in the BRFSS.
IV. Conclusion
Our results suggest that increased coverage 
due to reform in Massachusetts lowered average 
hospital costs for the insured, and thus average 
premiums before loading, by about $124. This 
impact, which represents an average premium 
change over all types of insurance, is consis-
tent with the aggregate change in premiums in 
Massachusetts. Between 2006 and 2009, premi-
ums in employer-sponsored plans followed the 
national trend, but premiums in the nongroup 
market decreased by 20 percent (Gruber 2011), 
comparable to the 3 percent overall decrease in 
premiums that we observe.
Our results also shed light on an important 
question for insurers and policymakers facing the 
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Figure 1. Evidence by County
Table 1—Evidence by County
IV OLS
Coverage −2,247.4* 37.49
(−2.18) (0.03)
Observations 48 24
Note: t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the county level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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introduction of the PPACA: who is likely to sign 
up for coverage, particularly through new health 
insurance exchanges? To generalize our results 
from the Massachusetts to the national reform, 
however, we should note that Massachusetts 
had “community rating” regulations that limited 
the ability of insurers to price based on health 
status in the nongroup health insurance market 
before the reform. These regulations could have 
increased asymmetric information, leading to 
adverse selection and higher premiums. In con-
trast, much of the country does not currently have 
community rating regulations, but the PPACA 
institutes them along with the mandate.
Despite differences in the community rating 
environments between Massachusetts and the 
nation, our findings are broadly consistent with the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predictions 
for national reform: premium changes from −1 
to 2 percent in the small group market and from −3 to 0 percent in the large group market (CBO 
2009). Comparison with the CBO estimates sug-
gests that large impacts of community rating in the 
nongroup market could be masked by changes in 
the employer market, unsurprising given that only 
5 percent of the insured in Massachusetts were 
in the nongroup market before and after reform (Kolstad and Kowalski 2010).
The existence of community rating prior to 
reform also makes the Massachusetts experi-
ence relevant in the case that the Supreme Court 
finds the individual mandate unconstitutional 
but upholds the community rating regulations. 
Our results suggest that a partial implementation 
of PPACA could result in an adversely selected 
market, leading premiums to fall by less than 
they otherwise would, or even to increase.
Table 2—Evidence by State
Coverage t statistic
Days health not good −2.413*** (−2.98)
Health prevented activity 1.869 (1.50)
Exercise 0.297*** (4.30)
Disability −0.213*** (−4.22)
Need equipment −0.125*** (−5.22)
Diabetes −0.0489** (−2.29)
Asthma −0.0536 (−1.65)
Note: IV estimates clustered at state level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
We have demonstrated that there was adverse 
selection into health insurance in Massachusetts 
before the reform. While this allows us to 
address some policy-relevant questions, our 
simple sign test does not quantify the magnitude 
of the welfare cost of adverse selection. In ongo-
ing work we extend this approach to estimate 
welfare losses due to adverse selection.
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